The Alliance of Power: State and Social Subject in the Economy of Violence. I Part

Power is neither a substance possessed unilaterally by the State nor merely an individual disposition of the subject. It is a relationship, an alliance of economy. In this economy, the State and the social subject are articulated in such a way that violence ceases to be an exceptional excess and becomes a resource that is organized, distributed, and—in many cases—normalized. This alliance does not necessarily require monsters.

Above all, it requires a structure that produces subjects capable of sustaining it, and a state apparatus that provides the conditions for that capacity to be activated and expanded. The State as a Producer of Conditions. The modern State holds the monopoly on legitimate violence. That is its classic definition. Yet, this monopoly is not limited to the use of physical force. It includes the capacity to define what is legal and what is not, who belongs and who is excluded, and which bodies deserve protection while others may be exposed to harm. When the State steers itself toward a project of intense domination, it transforms that capacity into a machinery of classification, control, and exclusion.

Recurring elements emerge in this process: the militarization of public administration; the creation of special units or the expansion of police functions to the armed forces; the suspension or rewriting of legal norms; and the construction of an emergency discourse that justifies extraordinary measures. Law ceases to be a check on power and becomes one of its instruments. Bureaucracy, far from acting as a brake, operates as a multiplier: it fragments actions, dilutes responsibility, and allows acts of great gravity to be carried out as technical procedures. The State does not act alone. It needs subjects to occupy its gears. It needs officials, soldiers, police officers, judges, doctors, teachers, and ordinary citizens who agree—to varying degrees—to participate in the economy of violence. This is where the psychic dimension of the social subject comes into play.

The social subject: a favorable psychic configuration

From a psychoanalytic perspective, the subject who aligns with this form of power does not necessarily exhibit a classic psychotic or perverse structure. Often, the individual possesses an ego that functions relatively well in daily life yet remains fragile when faced with the demands of the group and authority. This ego is sustained by archaic defense mechanisms that find a fertile environment for expression within the state apparatus. Splitting plays a central role.

The world is divided into an idealized "us" and a threatening "them." This division shields the subject from the ambivalence and anxiety that would arise from acknowledging the full humanity of the other. Projection and projective identification complete the circuit: unacceptable aspects of the self—aggression, weakness, envy, fear—are cast out onto the excluded group. The other becomes the receptacle for everything the subject cannot tolerate within themselves. The superego, meanwhile, tends to become externalized.

The voice of personal conscience weakens, replaced by the voice of the group, the leader, or "reason of state." Individual guilt is neutralized through the diffusion of responsibility: "I am just following orders," "it is the procedure," "if I don't do it, someone else will." Furthermore, belonging to a powerful collective offers narcissistic reinforcement. Group grandiosity compensates for individual narcissistic wounds, bestowing a sense of superiority and purpose. In this configuration, aggression does not erupt chaotically; instead, it is channeled. The destructive drive is directed outward and legitimized as a matter of defense, hygiene, or historical necessity. The subject may act with a remarkable degree of emotional numbing. They do not always derive pleasure from the harm inflicted; often, they simply fail to register it as harm at all. Dissociation allows the action to proceed without the intrusion of depressive anxiety or reparative guilt.